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Mid Staffordshire: a Case Study of Failed
Governance and Leadership?
JUDITH SMITH AND NAOMI CHAMBERS
Abstract
The public inquiry chaired by Robert Francis QC into failings of care at the Mid Staffordshire
NHS Foundation Trust made 290 recommendations about matters including: standards of
patient care in the National Health Service (NHS); organisational culture and leadership; the
use of data and information; the need for greater openness; and compassionate and commit-
ted nursing. In this paper, we argue that Mid Staffordshire represented a profound failure of
governance and leadership. We use findings from a national research study to analyse the
response made by the boards and leadership of NHS hospitals to the inquiry recommenda-
tions, setting out the repertoire of board roles and behaviours required for the governance of
safe and effective care.
Keywords: public inquiries, healthcare boards, healthcare governance, Francis inquiry, lead-
ership
Background
IN 2013, Sir Robert Francis QC published the
report of the public inquiry into Mid
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, setting
out his conclusions about the failings in care
which occurred at Stafford Hospital between
2005 and 2009.1 The events in Stafford had
been brought to light initially through the
sustained efforts and campaigning of a
patient and carers’ group called Cure the
NHS, and included many cases of shockingly
poor nursing and medical care, particularly
for older people and those who were dying,
and also those treated in the hospital’s acci-
dent and emergency department. Details of
the failings in care had been set out in a prior
independent inquiry report also written by
Robert Francis, and the founder of Cure the
NHS, Julie Bailey, wrote her excoriating
account of what happened at Stafford Hospi-
tal in a book From Ward to Whitehall: the
Disaster at Mid Staffs Hospital.2,3 The public
inquiry was established in 2010 by the
incoming coalition government explicitly to
explore ‘the operation of the commissioning,
supervisory and regulatory organisations and
other agencies, including the culture and sys-
tems of those organisations in relation to
their monitoring role . . . and to examine why
problems at the Trust were not identified
sooner; and appropriate action taken’.4
The report of the public inquiry, the Fran-
cis report, set out 290 recommendations for
various parts of the NHS at a local, regional
and national level, and other recommenda-
tions for a wide range of national regulatory
and professional bodies including the Health
and Safety Executive, Care Quality Commis-
sion, and the Department of Health. The rec-
ommendations were grouped into six
themes: common values; fundamental stan-
dards; openness, transparency and candour;
compassionate, caring and committed nurs-
ing; strong patient-centred leadership; and
accurate, useful and relevant information.
Some of the specific recommendations that
have subsequently been implemented in the
NHS include: regular monitoring and public
reporting of safe staffing standards in hospi-
tals; the requirement that clinicians and man-
agers work with a ‘duty of candour’ towards
patients and relatives, being honest and up
front when mistakes have been made and/
or harm has occurred; the establishment of
an NHS Leadership Academy to design and
deliver training and development to NHS
clinicians and managers about patient-
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centred leadership; and extensive work to
improve the nature, operation and effective-
ness of patient complaints procedures.
Governance and leadership at
Stafford
One of the most frequently heard questions
about the events at Stafford Hospital is ‘how
on earth was this able to happen?’. The sheer
number of patients, families and hospital
staff (those who became ‘whistleblowers’)
reporting poor care, and over such an
extended period of time, appears astonishing
in the context of a publicly funded national
health system in a major developed nation.
Robert Francis’ overall diagnosis of Stafford
was that there was ‘A culture focused on
doing the system’s business—not that of the
patients.’5 He pointed to a lack of compas-
sion amongst hospital staff, noting that
many of them were disengaged from the
organisation, keeping quiet as they feared
getting into trouble. Francis also highlighted
a failure on the part of many professional
and patient groups (not Cure the NHS) to
think sufficiently about the needs of patients,
and a concern that regulators appeared to
miss what was most important for patients
and their families. Indeed, Francis identified
over fifty occasions where different health
organisations missed opportunities to spot
and act upon the events that were taking
place at Stafford Hospital. This all begs a
very profound question about what had
gone wrong with the governance and leader-
ship at Stafford.
Stafford Hospital was in many respects an
isolated organisation, situated on the periph-
ery of the NHS’ West Midlands and North
West Regions. As a district general hospital
—one of many built in the late 1960s and
early 1970s following publication of Enoch
Powell’s Hospital Plan and typically in rural
shire counties or on the outer rim of major
conurbations—Stafford was trying to pro-
vide a comprehensive range of local health
services, yet struggling to attract and retain
sufficient senior and specialised clinical staff,
and keep core facilities such as its accident
and emergency department open on a
twenty-four-hour basis.6 It was not suffi-
ciently networked with major teaching
hospitals, and performance management of
the organisation (the NHS foundation trust)
was found by the Francis inquiry to be inad-
equate. All of this arguably contributed to
the pressure faced by those working in, and
seeking to lead and govern, Stafford Hospi-
tal.
A further factor contributing to the weak-
ness in governance and leadership of Staf-
ford Hospital was the nature of its
management team. The chief executive was
in his first such role—district general hospi-
tals (DGHs) are often considered appropriate
as ‘first step’ chief executive roles, but given
the complexity and isolation of some such
hospitals as outlined above, leading a DGH
is arguably one of the toughest roles in the
NHS. The wider executive team of Stafford
Hospital was described by the Francis report
as being out of touch with patient and carer
experience, and disconnected from the priori-
ties and concerns of frontline staff. Indeed,
the board of the hospital trust seemed more
preoccupied with looking upwards to regu-
lators and performance management bodies
(for example, pursuing the elite ‘foundation
trust’ status on offer to high performing
NHS organisations and achieving national
waiting time and financial targets) rather
than looking inwards to its staff, patients
and clinical services, or outwards to the pop-
ulation of Stafford.
Some critics of the public inquiry argue that
Francis stopped short of pinning the blame
for failures of care on any one person or
organisation. This was not in fact true. On the
day that the inquiry report was published in
London, Francis said in his public statement:
‘What brought about this awful state of
affairs? The trust board was weak. It did not
listen sufficiently to its patients and staff or
ensure the correction of deficiencies brought
to the Trust’s attention. It did not tackle the
tolerance of poor standards and the disen-
gagement of senior clinical staff from manage-
rial and leadership responsibilities.’7
As well as the board, there was a wider
failure of governance at Stafford Hospital
that contributed to the sustained lack of
attention to the many examples of inade-
quate care, disengaged staff, and unneces-
sary deaths. There were many who held
formal governance roles who just did not
seem to notice what was unfolding at
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Stafford, or if they did, failed to act on what
they saw or heard. For example, NHS com-
missioners were funding care at Stafford as
part of contracts that set out quality stan-
dards; senior doctors were undertaking a
clinical audit of services in their hospital,
and all clinicians in the trust were subject to
professional codes of conduct which require
the reporting of poor treatment of patients;
universities and deaneries were assessing
Stafford as fit for training medical, nursing
and other students; local government scru-
tiny bodies failed to see the full picture; and
Monitor, the regulator, approved Stafford for
foundation trust status—a decision that was
signed off by the Secretary of State for
Health. It should be noted, however, that it
was the NHS regulator the Healthcare Com-
mission that eventually blew the public
whistle on Stafford in a report published in
2009, responding to concerns put to them by
Cure the NHS.
The conundrum of ‘culture’
As with many other NHS public inquiries
over the past fifty years, for example the
2000 Bristol inquiry into paediatric heart sur-
gery, ‘culture’ was identified by Francis as
being problematic at Stafford and something
needing to be attended to if such failures of
care were to be avoided in future. When dis-
cussing his public inquiry report after its
publication, Francis suggested that the nega-
tive culture he identified at Stafford was
formed of a toxic mix of pressure (for exam-
ple, targets, financial troubles), negative reac-
tions to such pressure (such as fear, low
morale, disengagement), resulting poor beha-
viour on the part of staff (for example,
uncaring, bullying, keeping one’s head
down), and then such behaviour becoming
habitual (as in tolerating poor standards of
care, denying problems, and taking comfort
from erroneous external reassurance).8 Fran-
cis presented this series of cultural dimen-
sions as interconnected within a closed
circle. This was very reminiscent of the ‘club
culture’ described by Sir Ian Kennedy in his
report of the Bristol inquiry based on analy-
sis by Smith and Ham of a hospital’s culture
where the prevailing atmosphere was one of
fear and blame: you were either in or out,
and were not expected to ‘rock the boat’ in
any way, and especially not by blowing the
whistle on poor performance.9
Reflecting on the Francis report in a man-
ner that resonates very clearly with the
inquiry chair’s own analysis of what needed
to be done to try and address the conun-
drum of organisational culture, Newdick
and Danbury pointed to four issues that they
considered to be critical. First, a need to
strengthen patients’ voice and influence
within the NHS, arguing that mechanisms
for patient involvement are deeply inade-
quate and nowhere near as effective as the
former community health councils abolished
in England in 2003, although it should be
noted that they continue to exist in Wales.
Second, Newdick and Danbury underline
the importance and value of the duty of can-
dour that Francis proposed for the NHS
(and which was accepted by the Department
of Health and enshrined in statute). Their
other two themes are interrelated, being
those of NHS managerial culture with a
relentless focus on good news and denying
failure, and then the Department of Health
and political centre’s sometimes overbearing
treatment of NHS managers and boards.10
These four dimensions have been analysed
by the Francis inquiry’s adviser on NHS
organisation as having the potential to create
damaging and negative health leadership
culture, and when positive and appropriately
focussed, to enable a positive, supportive,
and compassionate working environment
and context.11
This analysis in 2013 concluded with the
following: ‘Get serious about strengthening
patient voice at a local level in the NHS,
implement a duty of candour with legal
backing, support managers and boards to
prioritise quality alongside their financial
and other duties and make sure the political
centre treats NHS organisations and leaders
in a mature and respectful manner.’12 This
begs the vitally important question as to
what has happened to NHS governance and
leadership in the six years following publica-
tion of the Francis report. Have the much
vaunted changes to organisational and man-
agerial culture started to occur? Is patient
voice stronger than it was, and critically, are
NHS boards feeling emboldened to prioritise
quality and safety of care alongside or even
over financial duties?
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What happened next?
To answer these and other questions about
what happened following the publication of
the Francis report, and the setting out by the
Department of Health of its formal response
and planned actions in Hard Truths: The Jour-
ney to Putting Patients First, the National
Institute of Health Research (NIHR) commis-
sioned a set of research studies in 2015,
through its Policy Research Programme.13
One of these studies focussed on changes in
board leadership of NHS organisations fol-
lowing the Francis inquiry, and was commis-
sioned from the Universities of Manchester
and Birmingham, and the Nuffield Trust and
undertaken by the authors of this paper and
others.14 The research—which forms the
basis of the analysis set out in this paper—
aimed to explore how boards and senior
leaders of NHS acute hospital trusts had
sought to implement the recommendations
on organisational leadership made following
the Francis report, and to examine the
intended and unintended effects of this. Fur-
thermore, the research aimed to uncover the
enablers and barriers to improving senior
leadership, and hence wider board and
organisational culture in the NHS, in the
context of the often toxic and unhealthy
management cultures described in Bristol
and Stafford, among other inquiries.
In scoping the research study, interviews
were undertaken with national health policy
opinion leaders to elicit their views about
the desirable characteristics of healthcare
boards. This built on a review of the aca-
demic literature in this area and resulted in
the dimensions set out in Table 1.
The depiction of board characteristics in
Table 1 is stark in how the dimensions of
board behaviours diverge from what was
found and reported in the reports of the
public inquiries in Bristol and Stafford. In
particular, they differ in their focus on rest-
less curiosity, the use of data to ask impor-
tant questions about quality and safety, and
being assiduous in remaining very well con-
nected to the concerns and priorities of
patients, families, and staff, as well as to
(and certainly not in preference to) national
health regulators. This articulation of healthy
board behaviours framed the NIHR study of
board behaviours and leadership following
the Francis report, and was used as the basis
for a national survey of board members of
NHS hospital trusts in 2016, and the devel-
opment of a set of six in-depth case studies
of hospitals where their board and wider
leadership behaviours and culture were
examined in depth in 2016–2017.
The national survey of board members of
NHS hospital organisations in 2016 elicited
381 responses, covering 90 per cent of NHS
acute services trusts. The findings of this sur-
vey are perhaps best summed up by a quo-
tation drawn from a free text response in the
survey, made by an NHS non-executive
director: ‘The Francis report has acted as a
reminder of what sort of organisation we
don’t want to be like, and continues to be a
reminder’. The survey revealed that follow-
ing the publication of the Francis report in
2013, NHS organisations had developed—or
revised and extended—a raft of policies
including those relating to the handling of
patient complaints, serious incidents, seeking
patient feedback, and staff engagement.
Indeed, whilst many board members
reported significant efforts to improve
patient and carer experience, and the
engagement of staff, it was salutary to dis-
cover that respondents to the survey
Table 1: Desirable characteristics of NHS
boards, as reported by national opinion
leaders in Chambers et al., 2018
• Are palpably focused on patient care
• Give priority to quality, safety and learn-
ing for improvement
• Are more problem-sensing than comfort-
seeking
• Know what is going on, for example wor-
ries of patients, staff and regulators
• Receive timely data on patient and staff
concerns
• Hardwire quality improvement through
the organisation
• Support staff, heed concerns, and protect
staff from negative pressures
• Promote a healthy, compassionate and
well-governed culture
• Use data and information as the basis for
improvement
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admitted that they knew more about what
was important to national regulators of the
NHS than they did about the priorities and
concerns of patients and staff. In this way, it
was clear that the overbearing nature of
NHS management culture highlighted by
Kennedy (in the Bristol inquiry) and Francis
was still alive and kicking—almost literally
in some cases—and that NHS hospital
boards found themselves compelled to look
upwards to regulators more frequently than
inwards to their patients and staff.
When asked in the research survey about
the main challenges facing their organisation,
hospital board members identified: patient
safety, trying to achieve financial balance,
dealing with the demands of regulators,
seeking to cope with workforce shortages
and having to navigate poor relationships in
the local health economy. Indeed, a central
theme emerging in the research was the pro-
found dilemma and tension experienced by
hospital boards in trying to balance care
quality and safety on the one hand, and
financial sustainability on the other. Whilst
the Francis report had led hospital boards to
make significant investments in nurse staff-
ing levels on wards and in emergency
departments, and many had also recruited
additional doctors to try and ensure patient
safety and care, it was clear that three years
on from the inquiry publishing its conclu-
sions, the NHS was struggling to hold this
line. Increasing financial austerity across the
public sector was being felt by NHS boards,
who, having invested in staff to address
known points of stress and vulnerability for
patient safety, were now feeling pressure
from above to stay within budget whilst
coping with a rising demand for services.
Thus, the research survey painted a pic-
ture of NHS hospital boards that had largely
regarded the Francis report as instructive,
timely and helpful. These boards had
responded to the report by increasing staff-
ing levels in critical areas of their hospital,
ensuring that the ‘duty of candour’ (for all
clinical staff in the NHS to be frank and
open with patients and families when some-
thing has gone wrong) recommended by
Francis had been fully implemented, and
working hard to ensure that their organisa-
tion was ‘well-led’ as required by the new
standards for governance and leadership
established by the Care Quality Commission
following the Francis inquiry. As noted
above, attention had been paid to improving
policies about patient complaints and staff
engagement, and finding ways to partner
with other organisations to try and improve
patient care. The Francis report had clearly
pricked the conscience of most NHS organi-
sations about the perils of letting care quality
and safety fall off a board’s radar, with some
stating in the research that ‘there but for the
grace of God go others of us’.
What was clear from the research was that
many NHS hospital board members were
exercising leadership that—following the
Francis report—appeared to be more visible
to staff and patients. Quality was reported
by a majority of board members to trump
finance on occasions where ‘push came to
shove’—something that was felt to have
been given validity and even authorisation
by the findings and response to the Francis
inquiry. Related to this, the research identi-
fied a rise in the influence of the chief nurse
on NHS boards, their voice being considered
more influential and powerful, particularly
in relation to matters of care quality and
patient safety. Furthermore, and unsurpris-
ingly, it was found that a board with stabil-
ity of membership and lower turnover
appeared to help it work in a unitary, and
yet healthily challenging, manner. Finally,
the research study revealed that those hospi-
tals with ‘outstanding’ or ‘good’ overall rat-
ings from the Care Quality Commission had
higher self-reported scores for emphasising a
full range of board purposes, including:
holding to account; supporting the executive
team; building organisational reputation;
seeking and acting on the views of a wide
range of stakeholders; and being effective in
reconciling the views of competing interests.
How can the NHS have healthy
governance and leadership?
The Francis report revealed an organisation in
Stafford that had completely lost its way in
relation to its governance and leadership, with
tragic consequences for many patients, family
and staff. The board of the hospital was out
of touch with what really mattered, namely
the quality and safety of patient care, the
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concerns and needs of those using the hospi-
tal’s services, and the pressures on staff
which, in turn, were fuelling an organisational
culture that in many areas was becoming tox-
ic, fearful and even dangerous. The research
undertaken by the team from the Universities
of Manchester and Birmingham showed
encouraging progress across the NHS in some
aspects of the inquiry’s recommendations.
The climate in which the NHS is operating
has, however, become more difficult since
the publication of the Francis report in 2013.
The National Audit Office has reported that
the combined deficit of health service provi-
der organisations in 2017–18 is £991 million;
staff vacancy levels across the NHS are run-
ning at around 100,000. Significant variation
in the accessibility, quality and patient-cen-
tredness of care, in levels of staff morale,
and leadership capacity and capability, all
persist and are now evidenced in Care Qual-
ity Commission inspection findings. NHS
trusts face multiple, simultaneous and seem-
ingly conflicting demands of ensuring finan-
cial balance, overcoming workforce
shortages, capitalising on the opportunities
of new technologies, dealing with the pres-
sures of population ill-health, and coping
with the fragility of the social care sector—
all of which add up to the need for a mas-
sive change effort. There is also an unpre-
dictable wider political and social set of
conditions: Brexit, populism, social media to
name a few. We are living in an uneasy age.
Given this challenging context, the analysis
of the leadership changes made by NHS hos-
pital boards, and the reported behaviours,
reasoning and responses of participants in the
research study, we suggest five key roles for
healthcare boards. Set alongside our under-
standing of theories about effective healthcare
board governance, we also propose a reper-
toire of associated dyadic behaviours for
board members to adopt.15 Drawing from our
analysis of findings from the empirical study,
the five roles we propose are: the board as
conscience, shock absorber, diplomat, sensor
and coach. These roles and behaviours are
summarised in Table 2 below.
What then does this suite of roles and
behaviours comprise for hospital boards
who are seeking to provide effective leader-
ship to their organisation? First, in relation
to the role of the board as conscience of the
organisation, NHS boards need to own the
legacy of the Francis inquiry in respect of
upholding fundamental standards of care,
and the principles of the NHS constitution
even when the external context makes it dif-
ficult to do so. This role of being the con-
science of the organisation includes leading
the development of a core set of values,
deliberative and inclusive approaches to
developing strategy and making priority-set-
ting decisions, and using listening and ques-
tioning behaviours.
Second, a recurring theme in research into
NHS boards is the burden of external regula-
tion and an often frenetic policy environment
where new initiatives can appear to shower
down upon hospitals and their leaders. In
these circumstances, boards need also to act
as a shock absorber for their staff. This
means absorbing the attention and challenge
of multiple external bodies, probing where
necessary, distilling the feedback into
Table 2: Proposed repertoire of roles and associated behaviours of NHS boards in the
wake of Francis, Chambers et al., 2018
Role Behaviours
Conscience: upholding the organisation’s mission
and the values of the NHS
Listening and questioning
Shock Absorber: supporting staff in adverse
circumstances and through difficult times
Courageous and probing
Diplomat: understanding and acknowledging
different internal and external interests and perspectives
Ambassadorial and curious
Sensor: using diverse sources of data to detect
and solve local problems
Challenging and supportive
Coach: setting ambitious aims, benchmarking
services, and seeking continuous quality improvement
Mentoring and inquiring
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messages that can be used to guide and sup-
port changes, and sheltering staff from
unhelpful external ‘noise’. As the director of
organisational development at one of the
case study sites in our NIHR research study
put it, ‘to filter all the nonsense that comes
from the outside’. This can include the adop-
tion of appropriately courageous and prob-
ing behaviours when communicating with
external national bodies.
Third, we identified the role of the board
as diplomat. This includes promoting the
reputation of the organisation using ambas-
sadorial type behaviours. But it also entails
having the curiosity and empathy to under-
stand and acknowledge the full range of
internal and external stakeholder interests
and perspectives, and knowing how to relate
to other providers and operate within the
local health and care economy. As a board
secretary described it in our national survey:
‘Although the relationships with others in
the local economy could not be said to be
“poor”, they are not necessarily helpful.
What is lacking is system leadership to try
to overcome individual agendas and encour-
age collective thinking and action for the
benefit of patients.’
Fourth is the role of the board as sensor,
having more of a problem-sensing than a
comfort-seeking orientation when scrutinis-
ing, with skill and wisdom, an appropriate
range of information, including qualitative
feedback on patient and staff experiences, as
well as maintaining a focus on key perfor-
mance indicators. In working with managers
and staff in the pursuit of better and safer
care, this includes exhibiting both challeng-
ing and supportive behaviours.
Finally, with the imperative for service
improvement and striving for excellence to
ensure sustainable and clinically effective care,
it is clear that boards also have a valuable role
as coach, using the analogy of the sports coach.
This involves setting ambition and direction,
assessing performance, and supporting staff, in
an inquiring, mentoring and collaborative way.
In the research study described above, this role
is best likely to be fulfilled when there is visibil-
ity, stability and continuity in board member-
ship, and board members are appropriately
trained and developed.
It is clear from this research that a whole
range of issues need to be contemporaneously
handled or resolved by the leadership of NHS
organisations—this requiring multiple skills
that are constantly held in tension—to enable
the work of the board to be achieved in an
appropriately sensitive and effective man-
ner.16 The dyadic sets of board behaviours are
presented in this paper as a way of under-
standing how some of these paradoxes and
tensions faced by healthcare boards can be
managed in an appropriate and robust man-
ner. For example, this may entail a board con-
fronting the possibility of closing a popular
local service which it knows is not (and can-
not be made to be) clinically safe. These board
behaviours can be understood further within
the theoretical framework of board gover-
nance and leadership developed in prior work
by Chambers et al.17
Thus it can be understood that board mem-
bers face choices in different situations about
how to deploy their repertoire of leadership
behaviours. In the circumstance of a board
having a low appetite for risk, in its role of sen-
sor it will need to seek out truths about perfor-
mance. Then, using an agency theoretical
frame, the board’s dominant mode of beha-
viour is likely to be challenging but also sup-
portive, to ensure management is not driven to
hide unpleasant facts about performance. In
circumstances which call particularly for a
coaching role to encourage collective innova-
tion, improvement and striving for excellence,
the likely dominant behaviours of the board
will be collaborative and inquiring, drawing
from a stewardship theoretical perspective.
In circumstances when the organisation needs
to build a better external reputation and
improved local relationships, we would argue
that the board has to prioritise its role as diplo-
mat, and behaviours which demonstrate
curiosity and ambassadorship are called for. A
focus on high levels of staff engagement and
long-term organisational sustainability indi-
cates the importance of representation, collec-
tive effort and sharing of risks, and the board
as the conscience of the organisation, with lis-
tening and questioning behaviours coming to
the fore to reflect the stakeholder perspective.
Finally, the board, acting as shock absorber to
ensure an internal and external equilibrium of
power interests, will need to be both probing
and courageous. Their responses to the Francis
inquiry report as explored in our research for
the NIHR demonstrated some of this.
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Conclusion
The legacy of the Francis inquiry has indeed
been identified in some beneficial impacts on
the intentions and behaviours of senior hospi-
tal managers and their boards. There contin-
ues, however, to be concern about variation in
the quality and consistency of such leadership
practices and in the current circumstances,
courage and diligence are required to create a
climate and culture for kind, safe and clini-
cally effective patient care. The deployment of
a comprehensive NHS board and senior lead-
ership repertoire of roles and behaviours to
mirror the complexity of the management
task and the trickiness of the external environ-
ment is required.
We make a case for the difference that the
dynamic and restless NHS board can make,
if the failings of governance and leadership
revealed by the Francis inquiry are to be
avoided in the future. This builds on the
work of board governance scholars who
have exposed the gap between the myths
and the realities of the work of boards in all
sectors, the variable discretionary effort of
board members, and the impact of minimal-
ist and maximalist board practices.18 In addi-
tion, our proposed board leadership
repertoire reflects the notion that the lived
experiences of senior leaders in the NHS and
the ongoing challenges they face cannot be
fitted neatly into traditional theoretical gov-
ernance categories. Switching from one mode
of behaviour to another according circum-
stances may be important, but so too is the
ability to deploy fully, across time, the roles
of the diligent board. Only if this happens
will we be able to assert that the chances of
‘another Stafford’ have been reduced.
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